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Abstract 
In his two-volume study of the cinema, Deleuze develops a novel conception of film in terms 
of its relation to the intensive becomings of thought. Great directors, for Deleuze, are those 
who invent images that stage disruptions to the habits of ordinary perception, forcing us to 
think and feel differently. It is precisely in terms of the production of a different style of 
cinematic thinking that we might frame encounters with the films of director Ozu Yasujirō, 
who I argue inaugurates a cinema in which contemplation replaces the primacy and 
certainties of action. Following Deleuze’s ([1968] 2004) rethinking of ‘contemplation’ as 
immanent event rather than subjective transcendence, I explore how Ozu’s cinema generates 
transformative modes of thinking the city, uncoupling urban spaces from the requirements of 
dramatic action such that they become expressive sites of indeterminate signs and affects. By 
dramatizing these immanent thresholds of affective and spatial becomings, I argue Ozu’s 















Introduction: Thinking film after Deleuze and Ozu 
 
In his two-volume study of the cinema, Gilles Deleuze ([1983] 2005, [1985] 2005) develops a 
novel conception film in terms of its relation to the intensive processes and becomings of 
thought. Opposing the psychoanalytic and linguistic approaches that dominated the film 
theory of his time (Stam 2000), Deleuze instead argues that film stages a direct affective 
shock to the brain, which involve the creative destruction of pregiven channels and the 
tracing of ‘uncharted’ lines of thought (1995: 60–61). By opening theorizations of the 
cinematic encounter to the materialities of affect and sensation, Deleuze seeks to unsettle 
representational assumptions of the relationship between thought and cinema itself. 
Following Deleuze, cinema is not simply a representational object that philosophy would 
reflect on (or ‘bring thought to’), but is instead a ‘machinic space’ of thinking productive of 
its own ‘cinematic thoughts and ideas’, which it thinks through the compositions of images 
and signs it produces (Huygens 2007; Bogue 2003). In an interview with Hervé Guibert 
following the publication of the first volume of his Cinema project, Deleuze states that his 
central argument in these books can be summarized quite simply: ‘The great auteurs of film 
are thinking, thought exists in their work, and making a film is creative, living thought’ 
(Deleuze 2006: 220). It is this capacity of cinema to generate a different sense of what it 
means to think which underwrites Deleuze’s famous thesis of the post-war transition from the 
‘movement-image’ of classical cinema to the ‘time-image’ of modern cinema. This shift 
between regimes of the image is thus associated with a concomitant transformation in forms 
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of thinking, from the ‘sensori-motor thought’ of the movement-image where thought is 
predisposed to functional and narratable sequences of recognitions and actions, to an 
intensive ‘thought-without-image’ generated by the time-image in which thinking becomes 
untethered from action-oriented perception to forge new connections with the virtuality of 
time (Flaxman 2000: 3). The greatest film-makers, for Deleuze, are therefore those who 
compose images that express new intense configurations of forces and virtualities in thought, 
disrupting habitual circuits of sense-making in ways that experiment with other ways of 
seeing, feeling and acting (Deleuze [1985] 2005; Rajchman 2009). Hence Deleuze’s claim 
that cinema invents ‘new possibilities of life’ (2001: 66), or as Paola Marrati puts it, cinema’s 
images present us with ‘other liveable configurations of thought’ (2008: 79).  
 In this article, I argue that it is precisely in terms of the invention of new creative 
configurations of thought and life that we might reframe the stakes of cinematic encounters 
with the films of the Japanese director, Ozu Yasujirō. Indeed, Ozu occupies a pivotal and 
unique position in the unfolding of Deleuze’s thought in the Cinema books (Cazdyn 2002; 
Deamer 2009). Of the hundreds of film directors Deleuze discusses, Ozu represents one of 
the very few non-western directors that he engages (along with his Japanese compatriots 
Mizoguchi Kenji and Kurosawa Akira) when elaborating his arguments (Martin-Jones 2011; 
Steintrager 2014). Deleuze ([1985] 2005: 13) provides an extended discussion of Ozu’s films 
in the first chapter of Cinema 2 ([1985] 2005), where Ozu is celebrated for ‘exploring and 
anticipating’, before the crisis of the war and in a Japanese context, the ‘direct image of time’ 
that would become the vocation of Italian neo-realism and the French and German New 
Waves in the 1950s and 1960s. Taking this discussion of Ozu in Cinema 2 ([1985] 2005) as 
my starting point, I want to draw out the implications of an encounter between Deleuze’s 
philosophy and the cinema of Ozu in two main ways. First, and thinking Ozu through 
Deleuze, I explore how Deleuze’s philosophy challenges established interpretations of Ozu’s 
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films. The history of Ozu’s reception in the western academic literature can be described as a 
kind of ‘tug-of-war’ between two main theoretical camps (Mars-Jones 2011: 34). Comprising 
one camp are the interpretations of the ‘Zen-transcendentals’, most notably Don Richie 
(1974) and Paul Schrader (1972), who see in Ozu’s films the expression of some 
authentically Japanese sensibility or transcendent aesthetic.1 In the other camp are the neo-
formalist interpretations of authors such as Kristin Thompson (in Thompson and Bordwell 
1978) and David Bordwell (1988), who are critical of such correlations between Ozu’s films 
and the cultural principles of Zen Buddhism, and who instead draw attention to Ozu’s 
‘modernist’ technical style and distinctive narrative form. What Deleuze’s philosophy offers 
is a very different approach to Ozu’s films, one that allows us to think in more ontological 
(rather than formal) and immanent (rather than transcendent) terms about the potentials of the 
cinematic encounter. For Deleuze, what Ozu inaugurates is precisely a new style of cinematic 
thinking, one in which ‘contemplation’ and thought replace the primacy and subjective 
certainties of action (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 15). 
One of the key implications of Ozu’s contemplative cinema is how it serves to 
generate new and transformative modes of thinking urban space. Focussing my discussion 
specifically on his use of techniques of false continuity, disconnection and the filming of 
empty spaces in two of his post-war films – Tokyo Monogatari/Tokyo Story (Ozu, 1953) and 
Akibiyori/Late Autumn (Ozu, 1960) – I explore how Ozu’s cinema reinvents our conventional 
ways of thinking and perceiving the everyday spaces of the city, opening creative possibilities 
‘to see the world anew’ (Rushton 2012: 64). Following Deleuze, I argue that we can 
understand Ozu’s cinematic techniques of framing and presenting the city as not just formal 
innovations – as Bordwell and Thompson (1978) argue – but also as ontological functions 
that serve to uncouple urban spaces and landscapes from the requirements of sensori-motor 
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thought and action such that they become expressive sites of indeterminate signs and 
unexpected intensities of affect. 
 Of course, Deleuze is not the only scholar to have identified a ‘contemplative’ tenor 
or style to Ozu’s films (Wills 1978). In recent years, a number of authors have heralded Ozu 
as the forefather of a contemporary style of ‘contemplative’ or ‘slow’ cinema that is 
exemplified in the work of modern directors he has influenced, such as Hou Hsiao-Hsien, 
Koreeda Hirokazu, Jia Zhangke, Claire Denis, Abbas Kiarostami, Kim Ki-Duk and others 
(Jaffe 2014; Flanagan 2008). This ‘contemplative’ style of modern film-making is defined by 
its privileging of a number of distinct cinematic tropes, such as the use of long takes, non-
linear and non-dramatic narratives, and an emphasis on a minimalist style of composition and 
visual content. In their influential readings of Ozu’s cinema, Richie (1974) and Schrader 
(1972) similarly note a contemplative tone to his films, highlighting various instances of 
characters in quiet and still contemplation as clear expressions of a Zen aesthetic and 
spirituality that they believe permeates his films. Turning my attention to the philosophical 
development of a more ontogenetic understanding of ‘contemplation’ in Difference and 
Repetition, I argue that what sets Deleuze’s ([1968] 2004) philosophical encounter apart from 
the more spiritualist interpretations of authors such as Schrader and Richie is how he 
understands these instances of contemplation not as subjective forms of transcendence, but 
instead as immanent and impersonal events of ‘individuation’. At stake in Ozu’s 
‘contemplative cinema’ for Deleuze is thus not the ‘transcendent break’ that would lead us 
out of the affective tensions and disparities of the world (Schrader 1972: 37), but rather an 
immanent reconfiguration of these tensions that reveal new possible connections of thought, 
urban space and time. 
 Second, and conversely, the final sections of the article also explore how thinking 
Deleuze through Ozu might enable us to readdress certain critical interpretations of his 
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philosophy. While other authors have explored the significance of Ozu for understanding 
Deleuze in terms of the mutual influence of Zen Buddhist philosophy (e.g. the conception of 
time as aion),2 in this article I focus instead on how Ozu’s contemplative cinema provides 
Deleuze an affirmative site for challenging the sovereignty of action over thought in 
traditional theorizations of politics. At first glance, this might seem like an unusual focus for 
thinking about Ozu’s films. Indeed, if there is one thing that unites the otherwise divergent 
Zen-transcendental interpretations of Schrader and Richie and the neo-formalist readings of 
Thompson and Bordwell, it is that Ozu’s cinema is resolutely apolitical, expressing an 
indifference to actual social relations and forces except as they impact on family relations 
(Mars-Jones 2011). I argue that these criticisms of Ozu have interesting parallels with the 
recent critiques of a ‘Deleuzian politics’ that we find in the work of Peter Hallward (2006) 
and Alain Badiou (1999), which, they argue, demands a paralysis of transformative action in 
favour of ‘spiritual communion with an otherworldly power’ (Hallward 2006: 162). In this 
article I instead explore how both Deleuze and Ozu enact a different thinking of 
contemplation, understood not as a passive form of stasis but as an encounter with the 
powerlessness of previously sanctioned responses to the emergent forces and signs 
comprising a new problematic field, an event through which thought is propelled to become 
creative (Hughes 2012). The event of contemplation thus becomes a central element of what 
Deleuze defines as the political task of ‘becoming-active’ (2001: 82), generating intervals and 
interruptions in our habitual, action-oriented perception that may allow other creative 
thoughts, dispositions, and actions to ferment. 
 




In a career spanning five decades (from 1927 until his death in 1963) and 54 films, Ozu 
cultivated and refined a singular and experimental cinematic style that continues to inspire 
and move audiences encountering his films today. Commencing from some of his earliest 
silent films of the 1930s, and working closely alongside his long-term scriptwriter Noda 
Kōgo, Ozu sought to distance himself from some of the narrative conventions, norms and 
techniques that were the staple of an increasingly dominant ‘Hollywood’ model of cinematic 
production. The film theorist Noel Burch, in a book on Japanese cinema frequently 
referenced by Deleuze in the Cinema texts, argues that Ozu’s cinema challenges two central 
principles defining the dominant ‘Western mode of cinematic representation’ (1979: 159). 
First, Ozu rejected the anthropocentric focus of Hollywood dramaturgy that centres the 
image on the thoughts and actions of human characters. One of Ozu’s cinematic signatures 
then are his frequent shots of ‘empty spaces’ characterized by the prolonged and 
‘unmotivated’ absence of humans from the screen (Burch 1979: 161). The second principle of 
the western system of representation challenged by Ozu was its emphasis on formal and 
narrative continuity (Burch 1979; Bordwell 1988). For example, an important technique 
employed by Ozu in a number of his films is ‘mismatched eyelines’, typically involving the 
characters looking disorientingly straight into the camera, which, as Thompson and Bordwell 
note, ‘refuses to inscribe the spectator in a fixed relaying position with respect to spatial and 
diegetic closure’, such that ‘the viewer must frequently reorient him- or herself in the spatial 
framework of the scene’ (1978: 63). Ozu also eschews expectations of narrative continuity 
through techniques of spatial disconnection – such as in Bakushu/Early Summer (Ozu, 1951), 
where the scene unexpectedly shifts from a shot of a corridor in a restaurant where the 
protagonist is tiptoeing to surprise a friend to a shot of a corridor in her home in a single cut – 
as well as through narrative ellipsis by entirely skipping over events and moments that would 
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usually constitute the dramatic core of a Hollywood film – such as the event of Noriko’s 
wedding in Banshun/Late Spring (Ozu, 1949) or the death of the mother in Tokyo Story. 
 More generally, Ozu’s use of such creative techniques can be understood as a strategy 
for countering the primacy of dramatic action in classical Hollywood cinema. In a famous 
statement on his cinematic style following the release of Late Autumn in 1960, one most 
likely made in riposte to the growing critiques of his conservative and ‘boring’ films by the 
young directors of Japan’s ‘sun-tribe’ (taiyozoku) movement (Burch 1979: 279), Ozu 
remarked:  
 
It is easy to create drama through actions and emotions in film – my aim is to 
make people feel without resorting to drama […] For a long time, I have 
wanted to do away with dramatic elements, to express sorrow without tears, to 
capture a sense of life without any emotional upheaval. (Ozu 1960: 93) 
 
Of course, there is a danger of reading too much into this statement and thinking that Ozu 
therefore rejected the narrative and affective potentials of dramatic narrative and form. On the 
contrary, films such as Ukikusa/Floating Weeds (Ozu, 1959), Kaze no Naka no Mendori/A 
Hen in the Wind (Ozu, 1948), and Tokyo Boshoku/Tokyo Twilight (Ozu, 1957) are clearly 
oriented around strong dramatic events and actions. What Ozu disliked about dramatic action 
was not necessarily the idea of drama itself, but rather the logic of thought its manifestation in 
cinema typically implies. Ozu therefore sought to disrupt the cause-and-effect logic and 
temporality of dramatic narration that ties the primacy of recognized emotions, themselves 
attached to distinct subjects and objects, with the decisive certainties of action. 
 Ozu’s remarks have a number of interesting resonances with Deleuze’s ([1983] 2005) 
discussion of the ‘crisis of the action-image’ in the final chapters of Cinema 1 ([1983] 2005). 
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Deleuze defines the ‘action-image’, which he argues constitutes the nucleus of classical 
Hollywood cinema, as a synthesis of perception (of an object or situation) and affection (of a 
subject): ‘the pair of object and emotion thus appears in the action-image as its genetic sign’ 
([1983] 2005: 163). Deleuze writes that in the cinema of the action-image we typically see 
the forces and tensions of a milieu construct a situation that surrounds the protagonist, 
constituting a demand to which he or she must respond. The character responds decisively 
with actions that transform the situation and which involve new relationships of the 
individual to their milieu as well as to other characters. The experience for the spectator 
encountering action-image films also tends to be one of orientation to the direction of 
narrative flow, as well as to the elements within the image that are crucial to an 
understanding of the whole. Following the philosophy of Henri Bergson, Deleuze argues that 
the logic of thought determining this unity of perception and action in the action-image is a 
logic of ‘recognition’ (Deleuze [1983] 2005: 146). In Matter and Memory, Bergson defines 
recognition as ‘the concrete process by which we grasp the past in the present’ ([1896] 1991: 
90) or, in other words, the way in which a subject draws on past experience to condition a 
present action. One of Bergson’s main points here is that the material process of recognition 
rarely passes through representation or conscious activity, but is instead the outcome of a 
series of involuntary, motor mechanisms created by repetition. This automatic mechanism is 
what Deleuze ([1966]1988: 67) terms, after Bergson, ‘sensori-motor recognition’, which 
isolates from within the continuous flux of experience only those elements that are of 
immediate interest, and which is attentive only to those fragments of the past relevant to our 
present needs. Sensori-motor recognition, as Anne Sauvagnargues (2013: 171) puts it, 
‘speaks directly to our muscles and the back of our knees’, inspiring a specific affective 
scheme within us whereby what is perceived immediately releases the interested action as a 
function of multiple social interests that we judge and to which we are subjected. As an 
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automatic and unthinking perception of the world, the sensori-motor schema at the heart of 
the action-image serves to stabilize intellectual and corporeal forces in ways that inhibit the 
creative emergence of new thoughts and relations.  
 The ‘crisis of the action image’ that Deleuze ([1983] 2005: 216) identifies emerging 
in European cinema following the devastation of World War II (and even earlier in the case 
of Ozu) is thus also a crisis of sensori-motor thought and recognition. In the first chapter of 
Cinema 2, Deleuze ([1985] 2005) notes that this delinking of images from the sensori-motor 
schema in modern cinema opens new virtual powers and potentialities of the image. Instead 
of being integrated through logics of action or narration, this new cinema of ‘the time-image’ 
assembles dispersive events and situations through ‘deliberately weak’, ‘elliptical’, and 
‘irrational’ links ([1985] 2005: 15). Space is also profoundly affected in this new cinema. 
Importantly, Deleuze locates the emergence of the time-image in the urban realities of war-
torn Europe and its legacy of cities in ruin (Pratt and San Juan 2014). As Deleuze writes: ‘In 
the city which is being demolished or rebuilt, neo-realism makes any-space-whatevers 
proliferate – urban cancer, undifferentiated fabrics, pieces of waste-ground – which are 
opposed to the determined spaces of the old realism’ ([1983] 2005: 216). In the modern 
cinema of the time-image then, the filming of well-defined places and recognizable features 
of the urban landscape (skyscrapers, landmarks) give way to the presentation of ‘any-space-
whatevers’ that no longer provide the appropriate setting for a determined action or situation 
but which instead embody the qualities of ‘pure potential’ (Deleuze [1983] 2005: 113): city 
spaces devoid of human movement (Michelangelo Antonioni), deserted landscapes and 
exteriors (Roberto Rossellini), or domestic interiors evacuated of their occupants (Ozu). 
Instead of serving as mere context or narrative support then, these fragmentary any-space-
whatevers function to disrupt the established coordinates of time, knowledge and memory in 
the city, opening urban spaces to new virtual conjunctions and potentials. Furthermore, and in 
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contrast to the rational ‘agents’ of the ‘movement-image’, the characters wandering through 
these deserted and disconnected spaces of the city are instead ‘seers’ who no longer know 
how to respond to the events that befall them (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 2). As Deleuze writes in 
Bergsonism ([1968] 1988), this ‘seer’ is a subject for whom ‘recognition has become 
impossible […] the subject no longer knows how to orient himself, how to draw, that is, to 
decompose an object according to the motor tendencies’ (1991: 68). Thought in the time-
image thus no longer extends directly into pre-established patterns of action, but instead 
‘lingers, oscillates, hallucinates’ (Flaxman 2000: 39). The gradual erosion of the sensori-
motor links governing the action-image gives rise to new types of cinematic image, images 
which must be seen, heard, and ‘read’, rather than simply recognized and reacted to (Deleuze 
[1985] 2005: 21). 
 Deleuze argues that the first compelling challenge to a cinema defined by the action-
image and sensori-motor recognition emerges in the films of Ozu. More specifically, he 
credits Ozu as the ‘inventor’ of what he terms ‘opsigns’ and ‘sonsigns’, which are defined as 
images that suspend thinking in a purely optical or sound situation that ‘does not extend into 
action any more than it is induced by action’ (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 17). Such situations, he 
goes on to write, force us to ‘grasp something intolerable and unthinkable in our present 
situation’, which cannot be understood or acted on according to extant habits of recognition 
or association, but that instead emerge in the mode of an encounter that can only be felt by 
character and viewer alike. These unthinkable situations in cinema could be the outcome of 
specific limit-situations – such as the daughter’s suicide in Ozu’s Tokyo Twilight (1957) – or, 
and more typically in Ozu, the unbearable and inexpressible intensities invoked by the banal 
rituals of family life, but in either case they give rise to new relations of forces that outstrip 
sensori-motor capacities, opening thought to the creative possibilities of thinking differently.  
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 The optical and sound images we encounter in Ozu’s films thus demand a different 
mode of attention and thinking than that associated with the action-image of classical cinema. 
Thus, whereas the sensori-motor action-image retains from the thing only those qualities and 
elements that interest us, the opsign ‘brings the thing each time to an essential singularity, 
and describe the inexhaustible, endlessly referring to other descriptions’ (Deleuze [1985] 
2005: 43). Such images are infinitely richer because they involve what Deleuze (1991: 68) 
terms, again following Bergson, modes of ‘attentive recognition’ that ‘bring us back to the 
object’ in order to restore its singular and indeterminate forces and potentialities. In unsettling 
the sensori-motor circuit that binds perception to action, Ozu’s cinema constructs alternative 
circuits that put perception directly into contact with thought. The empty spaces and still lifes 
that populate his films are thus not sites of recognizable action, but might instead be 
understood as what Deleuze terms instances of ‘pure contemplation’ that bring about ‘the 
immediate identity of the subject and the object, the world and the I’ ([1985] 2005: 15). At 
first glance, and in terms of the usual meaning ascribed to the concept in philosophy, 
‘contemplation’ would appear to presuppose the forms of ontological separation (i.e. 
contemplating subject/ contemplated object) that run contrary to the kind of immanent 
process Deleuze is seeking to identify here (Zourabichvili 2012: 115; Buchanan 1999). 
However, if we turn to Difference and Repetition we can see that Deleuze ([1968] 2004: 94) 
actually makes an important distinction between two different modes of contemplation. On 
the one hand we have the ‘active synthesis’ that corresponds to our traditional understanding 
of contemplation as a subjective form of reflection and recognition (e.g. ‘the chess player 
contemplates his next move’). Contemplation in the active synthesis is oriented towards 
action, and moves in the direction of actual objects recognized as necessary to achieve this 
action. But Deleuze also argues that this active synthesis is itself dependent on an originary 
and non-conscious ‘passive synthesis’, which he defines as an impersonal event of 
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individuation constituting these active forms of sensibility (Deleuze [1968] 2004: 100). The 
passive synthesis of contemplation thus involves the immanent capture and contraction of 
material forces to produce a new individuation, such as the formation of the eye out of soft 
tissue that is successful in capturing and organizing the flow of light (Zourabichvili 2012: 
115). Deleuze notes that the passive synthesis does not give rise to the actual forms and 
representational objects that comprise the sensori-motor recognition of the active synthesis, 
but instead involves the manufacture of a different ‘virtual object’ – the sign. Departing from 
traditional semiotic approaches that reduce the sign to questions of signification and 
representation, Deleuze argues that signs are instead linked to material events of thought and 
affect, ‘act[ing] directly on the nervous system, rather than passing through the detour of the 
brain’ ([1981] 2005: 43). Thought materially encounters the sign as the expression of an 
‘enveloped possible world unknown to us’, comprising forces and ‘points of view’ that 
exceed the sensori-motor image we have of a particular object or situation (Deleuze [1964] 
2008: 6). As I highlight in the following section, what Ozu’s films can be understood to 
realize and give expression to is precisely this creative vocation of cinema: the production of 
non-representational signs that cannot be situated within the topos of recognition, and which 
thus confront thought with what it has yet to think. 
 
Contemplating signs and empty spaces 
 
Whilst Ozu’s films rarely departed from the central narrative themes of the shomin-geki, a 
film genre that took as its focus the everyday rituals and ordinary routines of contemporary 
Japanese life (such as intergenerational disagreements and squabbles, the struggles of 
parenthood, dinner reunions with old friends), his cinematic innovation was to move beyond 
the logics of sensori-motor recognition by which these rituals are typically given form. 
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Crucial to Ozu’s disruption of sensori-motor thought were his creative experiments with the 
cinematic techniques of ellipsis and false continuity that instead foreground the indeterminate 
possibilities of sensations and affects. Whereas Noel Burch (1979: 277) claims that the 
stylistic traits that defined the dynamic potential of Ozu’s earlier work become rather stale 
and repetitive in his later films, and especially following his turn to colour in the late 1950s, I 
argue that these later films actually provide some of the most innovative and varied 
illustrations of his continually developing cinematic thought and style. Late Autumn (Ozu, 
1960), a film that reworks the father–daughter plot of his 1949 film Late Spring but focussing 
instead on the widowed mother–daughter relationship,3 while often considered an inferior 
remake is actually a technically and affectively different kind of film. What comes to the fore 
in this film, perhaps more so than in any of his others, is Ozu’s creative play with difference 
and indeterminacy. A particularly evocative example of this indeterminacy is a sequence 
towards the end of the film where both the mother (Akiko – played by Hara Setsuko) and the 
daughter (Ayako – played by Tsukasa Yoko) are enjoying a last spa break before the 
daughter’s impending marriage. During this scene, Ayako, who has reluctantly agreed to 
marry on the basis of a series of misunderstandings that she was an obstacle to her mother’s 
own plans for remarriage, suddenly breaks down crying. Noticeably absent from this 
sequence, however, are the narrative devices and elements, such as continuity of dialogue and 
eye-line matches, which would allow us to ascribe a precise meanings to these tears. The 
fragmentary clues and imprecise signs in this expression of emotion interrupt our habits of 
recognition and interpretation as viewers – we are left uncertain as to whether they symbolize 
tears of selfishness or selflessness, happiness or sadness. Instead of resolving this question, 
Ozu leaves us with these missing pieces, cutting to an image of a forested mountain at the 
bottom of which a group of school children are lining up to take a photo, before returning to 
the mother and daughter packing their belongings to return home. 
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 Through the use of such techniques of ellipsis in his films, Ozu sought to disrupt the 
sensori-motor circuit that tethers perceptions and affections to the recognized actions that will 
arise in response to them. For Ozu, this cause-and-effect logic of dramatic narration gives the 
game away too easily, it fails to provoke thinking. The subjects populating Ozu’s films are 
thus presented not as the assured agents of classical cinema that maintain their transcendent 
integrity through the vicissitudes of experience but instead as processes of becoming, their 
thoughts and gestures re-imagined as emergent expressions of the imperceptible forces and 
uncertain intensities that weave the immanent fabric of life. To further illustrate the creative 
implications of Ozu’s use of ellipsis for thought we can turn to the very last scene of Late 
Autumn, in which we encounter the mother, Akiko, alone in her apartment following the 
event of her daughter’s wedding (which in typical Ozu fashion is not shown). What this 
sequence highlights for our discussion is the affective potential of Ozu’s distinctive use of 
spatial composition. While Ozu’s spatial framing in this final sequence clearly isolates the 
physical fact of her isolation, his interruption of the narrative transition of her expression 
leave us, as viewers, partially uncertain of how to read the smile that slowly forms on 
Akiko’s face. The space and time of this narrative transition is elided through irrational cuts 
to spaces beyond the periphery of action, such as a shot of the empty hallway outside her 
apartment. Burch (1979: 169) famously calls these ambivalent spatial cutaways ‘pillow-
shots’,4 which serve to interrupt the viewer’s sense of orientation to the sequence through 
images that are unattributable to the perceptions, actions or interests of any individual 
character. Following Deleuze ([1985] 2005: 15), we might argue that images such as this of 
Akiko’s elusive smile are expressions of what he terms ‘pure contemplation’, which seek to 
extend the affective experience of our encounter with the image rather than allow it to resolve 
itself into pre-established cognitions. Through these sequences in Late Autumn, I think we 
can begin to grasp more firmly how Deleuze re-imagines the ‘contemplative’ potentials of 
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Ozu’s cinema: its capacity to extract from immanent worlds of tension and disparity new 
affective signs (Ayako’s tears, Akiko’s smile) that generate creative disturbances in the 
sensori-motor circuit driving perception to action, catalysing a different kind of thinking and 
feeling at the limits of extant capacities.  
 
<<insert figure 1 here>> 
 
Of course, another feature integral to this interruptive potential of Ozu’s films are his 
experiments with techniques of spatial framing and composition when filming the spaces of 
the city. The events of almost all of Ozu’s films take place in the city of Tokyo where he 
lived most of his life, and five of his films even have the word ‘Tokyo’ in their title (Berra 
2011).5 As John Berra (2015: 12) notes, Tokyo is thus a constant presence in Ozu’s films, but 
it is a presence that is often only indirectly felt through his use of transitions and cutaways to 
the spaces, scenes and sounds of everyday urban life. The Tokyo expressed in his films, 
however, is not the sweeping cityscape or neon-lit skyscrapers to which we might be 
accustomed, but is rather the interior spaces of new suburban residences and the cramped 
alleyways of old entertainment districts. Urban experience in Ozu’s cinema is thus marked by 
a profound sense of disorientation for both viewers and characters alike, whether this is the 
disorientation of elderly relatives overwhelmed by the frenetic bustle and vast concrete 
expanse of the city (Tokyo Story), or of young children confused and frustrated by the social 
mores and conventions of suburban life (Ohayo!/Good Morning!). A clear example of this 
spatial disorientation is a scene in Tokyo Story in which Noriko (Hara Setsuko) takes her 
elderly in-laws on a bus tour through central Tokyo, which as the tour guide announces 
attempts to ‘trace the illustrious history of this great city’ (Ozu, 1953). In this sequence, Ozu 
cuts between close-ups of the mother and father following the tour guide’s directions inside 
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the bus, to passing shots of the bustling avenues of the Ginza district looking out of the front 
window of the bus. Leaving the bus tour, the family climb the exterior stairs of one of 
Ginza’s department stores for a panoramic view of the city, but appear disappointed when 
they are unable to orient themselves in relation to the households and locales of the few 
people they know in the city. Expressed in this sequence, I argue, is a different cinematic 
thinking of urban space, one which disrupts conventional understandings of the city as a 
continuous whole that could be grasped in its totality. Ozu’s distinct use of techniques of 
spatial framing and editing in this sequence instead presents Tokyo as a vibrant mass of 
fragmented and disconnected spaces, organized not around a hierarchical centre but rather 
through the discontinuous affective contrasts of domestic interiors and monumental office 
buildings and residential complexes (Guattari 2015).  
 In filming these interior and exterior spaces of the city, one of the key traits of the 
classical cinema of action that Ozu consistently sought to undo was the subordination of 
urban space to the logics of dramatic narrative, in which space is ‘used up’ by the 
presentation of narratively important settings, dominant actions, or psychological traits of 
characters (Thompson and Bordwell 1978: 42). Through the use of techniques of urban 
disconnection (as in the tour-bus sequence above) and spatial vacuity, Ozu can be understood 
to shift the ontological axis of his images of the city from action to affect and thought (Clarke 
and Doel 2007). Of all his films, Tokyo Story (Ozu, 1953) again presents one of the most 
evocative illustrations of Ozu’s distinctive style of spatial framing. In Tokyo Story we see the 
way in which Ozu subtly yet insistently rejects classical cinematographic techniques of 
spatial framing – such as the 180-degree rule and establishing shots that orientate the viewer 
to the space–time of action on-screen – in favour of frequently punctuating his films with 
images of empty spaces (of contiguous urban landscapes or empty rooms) that are devoid of 
any narrative reference to the actual perspectives or movements of characters. By introducing 
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a hiatus in the diegetic flow linking human perceptions to action, Deleuze ([1985] 2005) 
argues that Ozu’s empty spaces are more than just aesthetic motifs (à la Richie) but, rather, 
ontological techniques that discover new affective potentials of the image defined in terms of 
its capacity to open an intensive thinking of time and becoming beyond action and 
subjectivity.  
 
<<insert figure 2 here>> 
 
The urban spaces encountered in Tokyo Story are thus no longer the passive backdrops of 
classical cinema, which are subordinated to the pre-given needs and goals of human action. 
Drawing on a concept from Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation and the 
topological psychology of Kurt Lewin, Deleuze calls this type of narrative space, structured 
by the sensori-motor schema of its characters, ‘hodological space’, in which we discover a 
‘principle of individuation’ (i.e. the motivations and actions of a particular character in the 
film) that is able ‘to explain, produce, and determine the subsequent course of individuation’ 
(the events that we see unfold on-screen) (Simondon 1992: 297). In Ozu’s films we see 
instead a less clearly delineated and prescribed form of cinematic space begin to emerge: ‘a 
space before action, a pre-hodological space, in which disparate tendencies communicate and 
overlap without being organised according to sensori-motor schemata’ (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 
125). Pre-hodological spaces are thus spaces of undecidability and possibility, opening 
thought to different narrative directions and other potential ways of perceiving the world 
(Holtmeier 2014). 
With Ozu we encounter how, in the modern cinema of the time-image, urban spaces 
are increasingly detached from the psychology of the subject to instead become modes of 
sensation that forces us to think. As Rajchman writes: ‘The world that cinema shows us is an 
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impersonal world prior to subjective consciousness and individualisation […] modern cinema 
thus maps the workings of a space and time at once preindividual and unconscious’ (2009: 
289–90). In sum, then, and by disengaging signs and sensations from the transcendent forms 
that would supposedly ground and organize them (sensori-motor subjectivity, 
representational or ‘hodological’ space), what Ozu foregrounds is the creative potential of the 
cinematic image to modulate and reconfigure immanent fields of force and process, which 
through their intensive variations put established thoughts and identities into crisis (Canning 
2000). 
 
Ozu and a cinematic thinking of immanence  
 
It is this immanent reframing of Ozu’s contemplative cinema – a cinema that does not lead to 
a horizon beyond forms of actuality so much as disperse and reconfigure them – that 
distinguishes Deleuze’s philosophical encounter from the transcendent interpretations we find 
in the work of director and film critic Paul Schrader (1972). In his 1972 book, 
Transcendental Style in Film (1972), Schrader attempts to outline what he sees as the 
common style and thought through which ‘the transcendent’ is given expression in film. 
Analysing the work of Carl Dreyer and Robert Bresson, as well as Ozu, Schrader argues that 
we can identify a standard formula for this ‘transcendental style’ in cinema, involving the 
emergence of a sudden ‘disparity in everyday life’ that, in turn, leads to a ‘decisive action’ 
that does not resolve the disparity but ‘transcends it’ (Schrader 1972: 49). However, and 
whereas the ‘decisive actions’ in the films of Dreyer and Bresson are quite ‘incredible events’ 
(such as the raising of the dead, or the burning of Joan of Arc at the stake), Schrader notes 
that the equivalent actions are much less dramatic and obvious in Ozu’s films, such as 
Noriko’s sudden tears at the end of Tokyo Story. For Schrader, such emotional outbursts in 
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Ozu represent instances in which the ironies and disparities of the world overwhelm the 
subject, producing emotions that exceed the character’s capacities of expression and which 
open instead to an experience of the transcendent. 
 
<<insert figure 3 here>> 
 
While Deleuze, like Schrader, identifies tension and disparity as important genetic elements 
in Ozu’s cinema (e.g. the conflict between generations, between couples, and, after the war, 
between American and Japanese banality), his understanding of how Ozu’s films express and 
resolve the conflicts of sense to which these give rise clearly differs. To draw out the 
different implications of Deleuze and Schrader’s interpretations, we can turn to a scene that 
both discuss from the end of Tokyo Story. In this final coda we encounter the grandfather 
(Shukichi – played by Ozu regular Ryū Chishū) sitting alone at home after his wife’s funeral. 
During this sequence, Ozu cuts between images showing Shukichi in quiet, contemplative 
repose and landscape shots of mountains rising above the harbour of his hometown of 
Onomichi. In his reading, Schrader (1972: 37) seeks to re-fill Ozu’s codas of mountains and 
empty spaces with a transcendent presence, arguing that they are instances of the overcoming 
of the conflict between man and nature. Such sequences, Schrader writes, generate 
‘extraordinary and inexplicable breaks’ in the perspective of the everyday, leading beyond 
the immanent conflicts and contradictions of the everyday ‘towards a new horizon of the 
transcendent’ (1972: 51). Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that Schrader is incorrect to 
think that such sequences in Ozu function as a transcendent break, theorising them instead as 
the expressions of immanent forces of reconstitution that create new intense connections of 
thought and world ([1985] 2005: 17). Schrader’s misunderstanding, Deleuze writes, is a 
result of the strict metaphysical separation he maintains between the realm of the ‘immanent 
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everyday’ and the ‘transcendent horizon’ ([1985] 2005: 13–14). This transcendent thinking of 
the potentials of Ozu’s cinema is something Deleuze seeks to critique in Cinema 2 ([1985] 
2005) through an engagement with the philosophy of Leibniz (Smith 2007). For Leibniz 
(1991: 5–6), the world is composed of immanent series that converge in a regular order but 
that only appear clearly as small sections and in a disrupted order, such that we tend to 
perceive breaks and disparities as things out of the ordinary. Schrader’s reading of the 
‘extraordinary transcendent breaks’ in the films of Ozu and others then, as Deleuze notes, is 
simply the result of his misunderstanding of the fact that ‘the oddest adventures are easily 
explained, and that everything is made up of ordinary things’ (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 14). One 
of the implications Deleuze draws here from Leibniz, and what he argues Ozu gives 
cinematic expression to, is a thought of the transcendent forms that organise sense (such as 
sensori-motor subjectivity, hodological space) not as absolute origins, but rather as 
contingent lines drawn through the virtual (Murphie 2009) – lines, he argues, that may be 
immanently redrawn. 
With regards to the coda of the mountain at the end of Tokyo Story, Deleuze writes: 
 
[N]ature does not, as Schrader believes, intervene in a decisive moment or in a 
clear break with everyday man. The splendour of nature, of a snow-covered 
mountain, tells us one thing only: everything is ordinary and regular, 
everything is everyday! Nature is happy to renew what man has broken, she 
restores what man sees shattered. And when a character emerges from a 
family conflict or a wake to contemplate the snow-covered mountain, it is as if 
he were seeking to restore to order the series upset in his house but reinstated 




Ozu’s ‘instances of contemplation’ are therefore re-imagined by Deleuze as events of 
individuation – as immanent acts of problem solving – that introduce new lines of 
communication between previously disparate tendencies and forces in ways that reshape the 
potential fields of thought, perception, and action. Here Ozu’s cinema is rethought as opening 
towards an immanent virtuality that brings the senses into direct relation with thought and 
time (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 17). Framed through a Deleuzian lens of contemplative 
individuations, sequences such as those of Noriko’s outpouring of tears in Tokyo Story or 
Akiko’s final smile in Late Autumn can be understood not as attempts to resolve the impact of 
loss and the uncertain forces of the future by invoking a transcendent horizon (à la Schrader’s 
interpretation). Instead these signs and sensations become disengaged from transcendental 
conditions to attest to the power of the immanent to affect bodies and situations from within, 
transforming them into something different (Murphie 2009). As I now turn to argue in 
conclusion, it is this defence of Ozu (as well as Deleuze) from such ‘transcendent’ and 
‘spiritualist’ interpretations that provides an important step for articulating a different kind of 
thinking about the politics of cinema and contemplation. 
 
Conclusion: Deleuze, Ozu, and a cinematic politics of contemplation 
 
A common trope in much of the academic literature on Ozu’s cinema has been the image of 
Ozu as a ‘conservative’ and ‘apolitical’ director, one who was stubbornly resistant to 
technological change (supposedly reflected in the fact that he came quite late to ‘talkies’ and 
to colour) as well as to broader societal shifts in values and attitudes (Schrader 1972: 18; 
Richie 1974). For the directors of Japan’s New Wave in the 1960s such as Oshima Nagisa, 
Ozu film’s depicted a tranquil society that no longer existed, bearing few traces of the 
tumultuous student protests and anti-occupation demonstrations gripping Japan at that time 
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(Bordwell 1988: 306).6 Deleuze himself was well aware of the critics in both Japan and 
Europe, such as Imamura Taihei, who dismissed any suggestion of the radical potential of 
Ozu’s cinema, and who attacked it as ‘insufficiently political for having replaced the potential 
of modifying action with a ‘confused passivity’ (Deleuze [1985] 2005: 18). Indeed, I argue 
that these criticisms of Ozu’s cinema have interesting resonances with the contemporary 
critiques of a ‘Deleuzian Politics’ we find in the work of theorists such as Peter Hallward. In 
his book, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (2006), Hallward claims 
that Deleuze’s ‘passive’ mode of philosophical vitalism – which favours the involuntary 
encounters of Leibnizian individuation over the voluntarist logics of the Kantian act – 
disables the possibilities of transformative action in favour of modes of abstract 
contemplation (2006: 163; see also Alliez et al. 2009: 161). Hallward argues that it is in 
Deleuze’s discussion of modern cinema in Cinema 2 ([1985] 2005), and specifically of the 
optical and sound images of Ozu, that one finds the strongest confirmation of this 
contemplative orientation of thought that opens ‘towards a virtual plane leading forever out 
of our actual world’ (2006: 115). The critique of Deleuze and Ozu advanced here by 
Hallward, however, is itself predicated on a hierarchical and reductive dualism of action and 
thought – what Hannah Arendt (1981: 6) famously identified as the superiority of ‘vita 
activa’ over ‘vita contemplativa’ – that lies at the basis of conventional theorizations of 
politics. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt (1981) thus highlights the way in which 
contemplation becomes distinguished from action as something ‘passive’ and ‘apolitical’, as 
a result of an understanding of thinking as a solitary activity involving withdrawal from 
others and the forces of the world. In Arendt’s work, however, thought and contemplation are 
still understood as obstacles to political action insofar as they involve the destruction of 
established codes of conduct and values that subjects rely on in conducting their everyday 
lives. For Deleuze (2008: 61), in contrast, it is precisely thought’s violence against the ready-
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made clichés and habits of common sense that defines the political vocation and potential of 
thinking as a creative activity that opens towards the immanent production of the new.  
 In Cinema 2 ([1985] 2005), Deleuze therefore offers a defence of Ozu’s 
contemplative cinema from such political detractors when he writes that ‘it is not the cinema 
that turns away from politics, it becomes completely political, but in another way’ ([1985] 
2005: 19). Through his engagements with Ozu and other directors of ‘the time-image’, 
Deleuze attempts to think political agency anew, beyond dominant voluntarist and 
subjectivist conceptions, and to undo the structural division of vita activa and vita 
contemplativa in order to rethink contemplation as a form of political action (Marrati 2008). 
Deleuze’s point is that the force of contemplation in Ozu’s cinema does not simply end with 
the crisis of recognition and paralysis of action, as Hallward argues. Rather, contemplation 
and thought become understood as individuating activities in the Simondonian sense, which 
intervene in and transform the pre-individual forces and intensities that are the ontogenetic 
conditions for novel becomings (Dillet 2013). In contrast to what we might term ‘molar’ 
theorizations of politics that would bind political processes to the intentions and actions of 
decisive human subjects, Deleuze conceives of contemplation and the cinematic signs it 
mobilizes as ‘micropolitical’, involving the cultivation of a heightened attunement of thought 
and bodies to the imperceptible differences ‘that we neither intend, nor perceive, nor 
command’ (Colebrook 2014: 106). Theorized as an intensive, micropolitical event, 
contemplation becomes re-imagined here as an immanent political process that reconnects 
modes of thought and action to the material forces that make them creative.  
 In contrast to the spiritualist interpretations of Hallward and Schrader, contemplation 
for Deleuze is thus not marked by a desire to escape actuality but rather by the potential for 
new and intensified engagements with this world. What encounters with the contemplative 
cinema of Ozu can be understood to open up and explore, then, are alternative registers of 
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temporal experience that imply other creative folds of thought, space, and agency. In this 
regard, Deleuze argued that the thought of modern cinema was much more advanced than 
conventional political philosophy, which remains tied to the temporalities of ‘action-oriented 
perception’ that overplay the sovereignty of subjective intention and agency to a thinking of 
politics (Connolly 2011: 4). The cinema of the time-image affirms what Scott Sharpe et al. 
recently describe as a ‘much more subtle temporality of politics, which our habitual ways of 
thinking and doing politics tend to underplay’ (2014: 116). This other mode of temporal 
experience involves the production of new material sensitivities to the emergent forces and 
affects that intensify the present and open thinking to the indeterminate potentials of futures 
yet to come. If the temporality of action-oriented perception is, as William Connolly notes, 
‘necessary to life’, then this second and more contemplative experience of time is 
‘indispensable to its richness’ (Connolly 2011: 4–5). The innovation and affective power of 
Ozu’s cinema is its creative exploration of how these disparate experiences fold into each 
other in the context of everyday urban life, intensifying action-oriented perception in ways 
that mobilize new possibilities of thinking and perceiving the world around us. When 
watching Ozu’s films then, what we encounter is a contemplative world of signs and empty 
spaces, one that immanently weaves the risings and fallings of the cicada’s song with a 
woman’s sobbing, and the image of a slowly forming smile to the distant sound of waves 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Richie (1974: 52), for example, argues that the Japanese aesthetic sensibility of ‘mono-no-
aware’ is central to understanding Ozu’s films, and can be translated as a sensitivity to ‘the 
bittersweet sadness of the transience of things’. Perhaps the most famous examples of this 
sensibility of mono-no-aware in Ozu is Hara Setsuko’s smiling acceptance in Tokyo Story 
(Ozu, 1953) when her young sister-in-law proclaims ‘life is disappointing, isn’t it?’ 
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2 For work exploring the resonances between Deleuzian concepts and the ideas of Zen 
Buddhist philosophy, and especially of the philosopher Dōgen, see Ott and Allik (2010) and 
Steintrager (2014). 
3 Adding to the sense of disorientation in Late Autumn is the fact that Hara Setsuko again 
appears, but this time as the widowed parent rather than the daughter she played in Late 
Spring. 
4 The term ‘pillow-shot’ was coined in relation to Ozu’s films by Burch who saw them as 
analogous to the ‘pillow-words’ (makuratoba) of classical Japanese poetry, ‘which usually 
occupy a short, five-syllable line and modify a word, usually the first, in the next line’ (Burch 
1979: 160). Relatedly then, the effect of the ‘pillow-shot’ is to serve as a visual interruption 
that creates a different expectation for the next scene.  
5 Viz. Tokyo no Korasu/Tokyo Chorus (Ozu, 1931), Tokyo no Onna/Woman of Tokyo (Ozu, 
1933), Tokyo no Yado/An Inn in Tokyo (Ozu, 1935), Tokyo Story (Ozu, 1953) and Tokyo 
Twilight (Ozu, 1957). 
6 This critique ignores the fact that many of Ozu’s earlier films, as well as some of his post-
war films, directly addressed societal issues and conflicts, such as Nagaya 
Shinshiroku/Record of a Tenement Gentleman (Ozu, 1947) – Ozu’s first film after the end of 
World War II – which explores the impoverished and destitute situation of those orphaned in 
Japan following the war. A Hen in the Wind (Ozu, 1948) is another post-war melodrama that 
focuses on the prostitution during the war. However, as American controls on censorship 
intensified in the 1950s, Ozu had to experiment with more subtle and indirect forms of 
political critique through his visual style and pattern of spatial framing (Bordwell 1988). In 
Record of a Tenement Gentleman, for example, Ozu cuts to an image of a soiled mattress, 
which is clear graphic match of the American flag, hanging to dry on a clothes line. 
